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This paper analyzes the role of mediators in the resolution of the Aceh confl ict within the 
framework of a three-step process. Two separate mediation efforts, one conducted by the Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue from 1999 until 2003 and a second one led by Martti Ahtisaari and his 
Crisis Management Initiative in 2004/2005, attempted to solve the Aceh confl ict. The author shows 
that beside contextual factors such as ripeness of the confl ict and advantageous relations between 
and characteristics of the confl ict parties, the success of Ahtisaari’s engagement can be further 
explained by procedural factors. These include mediator behaviour and mediation strategies. 
Furthermore the mediator’s ability to use contacts with offi cial track one actors was crucial in 
securing the signing as well as the implementation of the present peace agreement.
Keywords: Confl ict Resolution, Mediation, Track 1.5, Aceh, Indonesia
Der Artikel analysiert die Rolle von Mediatoren in der Lösung des Aceh Konfl ikts mittels eines drei-
Phasen Modells von Konfl iktlösung. Zwei voneinander unabhängige Mediationsverfahren, jenes 
des Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue von 1999 bis 2003, und ein weiteres geleitet durch Martti 
Ahtisaari und seiner Crisis Management Initiative in 2004/2005, zielten darauf ab den Konfl ikt 
zu lösen. Der Autor zeigt, dass neben kontextuellen Faktoren wie einer “ripeness” des Konfl ikts 
sowie günstigen Veränderungen auf Seite der Konfl iktparteien, prozedurale Faktoren für den Erfolg 
Ahtisaaris entscheidend waren. Diese Faktoren beziehen sich auf das Agieren und die Strategien des 
Mediators. Die Fähigkeit des Mediators, Kontakte zu offi ziellen “track one” Akteuren aktiv während 
des Mediationsprozesses zu nutzen, bildete einen Schlüsselfaktor darin einen Friedensschluss und im 
weiteren Verlauf eine weitgehend erfolgreiche Umsetzung des aktuellen Abkommens zwischen den 
ehemaligen Konfl iktparteien zu erreichen.
Schlagworte: Konfl iktlösung, Mediation, Track 1.5, Aceh, Indonesien
1 Robert M. Heiling is currently a Magister candidate at the University of Vienna. The present article is based 
on findings of his diploma thesis, titled “Track One and a Half Diplomacy in Aceh”, which deals with mediation 
efforts in the Aceh conflict. Robert M. Heiling is expected to finish his Magister studies in early 2009.
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Introduction
This paper seeks to outline and analyze the contribution of mediation processes to the 
resolution of the Aceh conflict. Despite the fact that a few researchers have already dealt 
with various aspects of the resolution of this longstanding conflict, the author believes that 
there has not been enough attention paid to all stages of conflict resolution as a whole. 
Therefore the author intends to elaborate on the periods of pre-negotiation, negotiation, and 
the stage of implementation. The author also believes that the concept of track one and a 
half diplomacy presents a particularly useful concept to describe the role of mediators in the 
resolution of the Aceh conflict. This concept helps in highlighting qualities of this process of 
conflict resolution that have been neglected in previous analyses.
After a brief elaboration on the historical roots of the conflict, the author will compare two 
separate mediation initiatives which took place in Aceh by drawing on the subsequent stages of 
a conflict resolution process. Among others, Walter (2002) has pictured conflict resolution as 
a three-step process. According to this view on conflict resolution, it is particularly important 
to include the stages of reaching an agreement as well as its following implementation when 
analyzing conflict resolution alongside the conflict parties’ decision to start or participate in 
negotiations. 
Theories on mediation and conflict resolution shall be applied to these stages of conflict 
resolution. Looking at the pre-negotiation stage, these shall be theories on the timing of 
mediation (ripeness), as well as on characteristics of conflict parties. During the following 
stage of negotiation, ideas on mediation strategies will be considered. At this point the 
procedural factors of mediation – the behaviour and characteristics of the involved mediators 
– in contrast to contextual factors like the ripeness of conflict, shall be analyzed. Finally the 
author will look at the characteristics of the two mediation initiatives as processes of track 
one and a half diplomacy.
The paper concludes that besides contextual factors, like a ripe moment as well as 
advantageous developments on the side of the conflict parties, procedural factors, in the 
shape of mediator activity, played a major role in bringing about peace in Aceh. Alongside an 
efficient mediation strategy, Martti Ahtisaari and CMI’s successful involvement can further be 
explained due to their usage of contacts to official state actors. Thus, the author interprets 
conflict resolution in Aceh as a track one and a half conflict resolution process. In the course 
of this process, private, informal non-state actors, as well as official state actors shared 
responsibility through the course of their engagement
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History of an Intractable Conflict
The conflict of Aceh is a long-time secessionist conflict, fought between the Free Aceh 
Movement, commonly referred to as GAM2, and the Indonesian state, over the independence 
of the north-most Sumatran province of Aceh. The root causes for the conflict date back to 
Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Unlike other regions in Indonesia, which gradually became 
part of the Dutch East Indies from the early 17th century on, Aceh remained an independent 
Sultanate with substantial regional influence until late 19th century. The territory was 
incorporated into the Dutch East Indies through the Netherlands’ most violent and costly 
war in Dutch colonial history, and violence in Aceh remained at a high level for the duration 
of Dutch rule (Reid 2006). Nevertheless, Aceh played an active and important role in the 
Indonesian war for independence. Its leaders, however, were alienated by its outcome. The 
subsequent merger with North Sumatra into a larger province and the set-up of Indonesia as 
a quasi secular, centralized state caused upheaval and led to the formation of an Acehnese 
rebellion. Under the leadership of Acehnese governor Daud Bereuh the rebels formally joined 
the Darul Islam movement of West Java. Its goal was the transformation of Indonesia into a 
federal Islamic state. The rebellion was soon to be crushed by Jakarta (Aspinall 2006).
Rebellion in Aceh broke out again in 1976 under the banner of GAM, this time fighting not 
for the transformation of the current national political system of Indonesia, but for complete 
independence from it. Causes for the rebellion included further increased grievances due 
to worsened centre-periphery relations between the resource rich province and Jakarta in 
the context of the even further centralized development regime of Suharto (Kell 1995: 51-
59). Since then the movement was led by Tengku Hasan di Tiro, a US-educated businessman 
and grandson of a well-known Acehnese ulama. GAM started as a small guerrilla movement 
comprised mainly of intellectuals, which was soon to be defeated by the Indonesian military 
(TNI)3. The movement’s leadership fled, forming an exile government in Sweden. In the early 
1980s the rebellion broke out again with the help of Libyan trained guerrilla fighters, this time 
gaining wider support among the population due to repressive actions by the TNI. Again the 
rebellion was to be defeated officially, only to re-emerge in the late 1990s (Schulze 2004: 
4-5). After the fall of Suharto and the steady growth of democratic and free conditions in 
Indonesia, the frame of the conflict changed significantly. A wide civil society movement 
emerged in Aceh of which many groups supported GAM in its claim for independence. GAM 
likewise changed its strategy, calling for a referendum concerning the future of the province, 
2 Indonesian acronym for Gerakan Aceh Merdeka.
3 Indonesian acronym for Tentara Nasional Indonesia.
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inspired by the recent breakaway of East Timor from Indonesia. GAM adopted the so-called 
East Timor Blueprint as its main strategy, aiming at gathering support from the international 
community to pressure Indonesia on Acehnese independence. The following years saw a 
significant increase of GAM control over Aceh as well as the involvement of new political 
leaders on the Indonesian side (Schulze 2006: 225-244).  Renewed outbreak of the conflict 
led to two sequential but separate international mediation efforts, the first international 
involvement in the history of the conflict. The two initiatives, both conducted by private non-
state actors, differed decisively in approach, style, strategy and, last but not least, outcome. 
The mediation process of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)4 from 1999 to 2003 
achieved only temporary mitigation of the conflict, followed by a backlash of violence. The 
effort by Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) on the other hand was 
initiated in 2004 just prior to the occurrence of the Tsunami which devastated Aceh among 
other regions in the Indian Ocean. This mediation attempt finally led to a comprehensive and 
lasting peace agreement, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is still in 
effect today. Although the two mediation efforts can be regarded as one long process, since 
HDC started a process of internationalisation and because CMI had the advantage of drawing 
on the experiences of its predecessor, for the purpose of analysis it is fruitful to look at the 
two efforts as separate processes in a comparative manner. 
Moment of Ripeness?
The way the two organisations got involved in the Aceh conflict could not be more diverging. 
For HDC Aceh was the first case for the young organisation ever to deal with. Its engagement 
in Aceh thus represented its first step onto the international arena and was based on the 
conclusion of a fact-finding mission to Indonesia, with the aim of spotting a possible area 
of involvement5 (Huber 2004: 20). Ahtisaari and CMI on the other hand were not actively 
pursuing involvement in Aceh but were contacted by a Finnish businessman on behalf of 
the Indonesian government (Kingsbury 2006: 15-21). These decisively divergent methods of 
involvement can already be seen as an indicator for what was to come. Moreover, the situation 
on the ground had changed between 1999/2000 and 2004 and thus HDC and CMI faced slightly 
different conflict environments. 
4 HDC was founded as “Henry Dunant Centre”, later the organisation adopted the official name of “Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue”. The organisation however is still commonly referred to by the acronym of HDC, which 
will be used in this paper as well.
5 This fact-finding mission took place during the crisis in East Timor and was encouraged by debates over 
a possible break-up of Indonesia. HDC decided to engage in the Aceh conflict due to an already large number of 
humanitarian actors involved in East Timor. Furthermore, in comparison to other conflict torn regions like Papua or 
Maluku, in the case of Aceh the mediator was able to deal with clear representatives on the side of the rebels.
174
Robert M. Heiling - Conﬂ ict Resolution in Aceh in Light of Track One and a Half Diplomacy
ASEAS 1 (2)
One prominent theory of conflict research focuses on the question of timing for the 
involvement of a third party in an intractable conflict. Zartman (1991) has brought forward 
the concept of ripeness, calling for a mediator to recognize the moment of ripeness when 
starting a mediation initiative. He concludes that a political or military stalemate between 
conflict parties can constitute such a moment that he labels as mutually hurting stalemate. 
This originates from the parties’ exhaustion; thus, the lifespan of the conflict is decisive as 
well. One central aspect of a mutually hurting stalemate is that both conflict parties actually 
perceive their situation as such a stalemate. A mutually hurting stalemate leads to a moment 
where both conflict parties realize that they cannot achieve their aims through confrontation 
anymore. As a result the adversaries develop a “conciliatory mentality” in contrast to a “winning 
mentality” and decide to enter negotiations (Zartman 2000: 226-229). On the characteristics 
of the conflict parties researchers agree that balanced power relations between them, as well 
as an internal cohesion of the adversaries, are advantageous contextual factors for mediation 
of a third party (Bercovitch & Houston 1996: 20-22). As a result of balanced power relations 
or power symmetry, similar to the idea of a mutually hurting stalemate, conflict parties 
will not enter negotiations if they perceive themselves to be in a superior, advantageous 
position. Internal cohesion of conflict parties on the other hand is important to reduce the 
chance of spoiler activity. The situation prior to HDC involvement in Aceh in 1999/2000 can 
be interpreted as a military stalemate, yet not as a mutually hurting stalemate as defined 
by Zartman. Neither of the conflict parties had been able to defeat their adversary militarily, 
nor had they been able to achieve their political goals through military means. However for 
GAM maintaining a costly confrontation for Indonesia already meant success in itself and GAM 
was further encouraged by the emergence of a civil society in Aceh, which supported GAM 
in its claim for independence (Schulze 2005: 32). Thus GAM did not perceive its situation in 
1999/2000 as a stalemate. The Indonesian side on the other hand was marked by retreat, while 
GAM increased its control over the province (Schulze 2005: 35-36). The picture that evolves 
is one of a near power symmetry between the two adversaries. The reasons for the conflict 
parties entering negotiations in 1999/2000 can be found elsewhere. For GAM participating 
in talks which were mediated by an outside third party meant that it was able to expand its 
strategy of internationalisation. The negotiations were thus functioning as a tactical interlude, 
and GAM was not ready to compromise on its main goal of independence (Mortif 2007: 115). 
Until 2004 the situation, however, had altered. After the collapse of the HDC brokered 
cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA) in 2003, the Indonesian side had launched its largest 
military operation in Aceh with the aim of defeating GAM once and for all. Although not 
reaching their ultimate goal, the operation had caused severe damage to the military structure 
of GAM (ICG 2005b: 4-6). In addition to this military aspect, by 2004 GAM found itself isolated 
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on the international stage – in comparison to 2000 (Mortif 2007: 119). Since the end of the first 
mediation effort in 2003, the international community withdrew its interest in the Aceh case, 
while in 2000 Indonesia had been given extensive international attention due to its shaky 
transition from Suharto rule and the breakaway of East Timor. Thus, the balance of power 
between the two opponents had shifted between 2000 and 2004 with a grown asymmetry.
While in 2000 the situation was marked by a near symmetry, in 2004 the asymmetry 
between GAM and the Indonesian side had grown decisively with GAM being in a weaker and 
defensive position (ICG 2005a: 1-2). Nevertheless, in both cases the conflict parties decided 
to engage in mediated negotiations. In addition to the new power relations between the two 
sides, one of the parties had changed in composition and cohesion. GAM remained united 
throughout both mediation processes, and loyalty to the GAM exile government in Sweden 
remained intact despite approaches by the Indonesian government to offer honeymoon deals 
to local GAM military commanders (Mortif 2007: 122). The Indonesian side, however, saw 
a change in terms of cohesion from 2000 to 2004. Indonesian presidents faced a complex 
situation in Jakarta, with outspoken opposition to a non-military approach among their own 
ranks coming especially from TNI. This concerned both President Abdurrahman Wahid, who 
endorsed HDC-facilitated negotiations with GAM as a means of conflict resolution, as well as 
his successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, who set an end to the negotiations mediated by HDC by 
declaring martial law (Aspinall & Crouch 2003: 13). The succeeding government of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to as SBY) however not only understood the 
necessity of keeping spoiler elements in Jakarta in check, but also succeeded in doing so. By 
2004 the control of the government over the Indonesian armed forces had increased. Thus it 
can be argued that the SBY administration represented a far more unified Indonesian actor 
than the previous governments (Mietzner 2006: 51). 
The situation in 2004 cannot by any means be described as a stalemate between the 
conflict parties and thus the ripeness model of Zartman of a mutually hurting stalemate does 
not apply. However the situation in 2004 showed a different kind of ripeness, since both sides 
developed something close to a conciliatory mentality, which Zartman sees as a necessary 
element of ripeness. On the GAM side this was caused by its weak military position while 
on the Indonesian side elements within the government favouring the negotiation option 
were strengthened by the election of the SBY administration. Even though the Tsunami did 
not play a role prior to the conflict parties’ decisions to enter negotiations (the adversaries 
actually decided to participate in talks days before the Tsunami occurred) this event certainly 
added a ripeness to the conflict, which did not exist before. The massive response by the 
international community by providing relief and reconstruction aid, and the involvement of UN 
organisations, international NGOs and donor countries, first of all led to an opening-up of the 
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province. Since the conflict posed a serious threat to relief and reconstruction work, donors 
and international NGOs were aware that a resolution of the conflict was crucial. Thus this 
“humanitarian context” put significant pressure on both the Indonesian government as well as 
on GAM to resolve the conflict (Sukma 2005: 9). Even though this was not the driving force 
in bringing the conflict parties to the negotiating table, as many commentators stated after 
the signing of the MoU6, this context had a major effect during the stage of negotiations by 
urging the conflict parties to take the upcoming negotiations seriously.
Both in 1999/2000 and in 2004 the international situation was favourable for mediation 
efforts. Before 1998 criticism against Jakarta’s Aceh policy only came from human rights 
organisations, whereas the international community remained indifferent about the conflict. 
Yet with the fall of Suharto and the East Timor crisis, international attention shifted to Aceh 
(Heiduk 2006: 21). This resulted in support for the HDC-facilitated mediation by several 
countries, in particular the United States. Since the early 1990s US-Indonesian relations 
were strained by US Congressional restrictions on military cooperation, due to human rights 
violations committed by TNI (Sukma 2006: 225). However after 9/11 the US gradually began 
to re-establish military ties with Indonesia. Indonesia became a major ally in the war on 
terror and the US thus asserted less pressure on the government to resolve the Aceh case 
peacefully (Martin 2006: 86-88). After the COHA agreement failed the international community 
again withdrew interest in Aceh. Yet with the occurrence of the Tsunami at the end of 2004 
international attention nonetheless shifted back to Aceh, preparing the ground for a second 
mediation attempt (Heiduk 2006: 21). 
Negotiations Under Mediator Auspices
Since the concept of ripeness focuses on the timing of mediation entry only, it is necessary 
to take a closer look at the subsequent stages of conflict resolution. As Zartman himself 
admits “ripeness is only a condition: it is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be 
seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through persuasion of a mediator” (2000: 
227). There exist a large number of definitions for the term “mediation”. A general definition 
by Bercovitch describes mediation as “a form of conflict management that involves an 
outsider, or third party, who is not directly a disputant” and further involves “various forms of 
assistance and facilitation, short of judicial or coercive steps, designed to help parties reach an 
acceptable outcome” (1991: 3). Writing on the discussion on the controversial question of the 
need of mediator impartiality, Smith has distinguished between two main types of mediation, 
6 See for example Time Magazine: The Light that came from Darkness. 01.08.2005.
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depending on the variables coercive potential and the mediator’s stake in the outcome (1994: 
446). Smith is drawing on Fisher and Keashly who distinguished mediation or pure mediation, 
which basically constitutes a facilitating, rather passive form of mediation, from mediation 
with muscle or power mediation, where the mediator is using carrots and sticks (1991: 33). 
Other distinctions among mediation types, for instance by Touval and Zartman (1985) or 
Kressel and Pruitt (1989), follow similar distinctions, depending on whether mediators try to 
influence negotiations through less coercive means like the improvement of communication 
and procedures, or whether mediators use a more directive, power based strategy. The former 
type can particularly draw on trust and confidence-building measures. Both being non-state 
actors, the mediation efforts by HDC and CMI belong to the group of less-coercive forms of 
mediation. HDC’s strategy was based on humanitarian aspects, which Griffiths described 
as “New Humanitarianism” (Martin 2006: 75). The main idea of this strategy was to combine 
elements of both humanitarian and conflict resolution approaches. This new style of third 
party intervention is explained best by Griffiths’ professional background. Prior to building 
up HDC, Griffiths had gained experience in various UN organisations such as UNICEF, and in 
humanitarian NGOs as well as in the British Foreign Service. Griffiths’ style as a mediator 
was further characterised by his attempt of building up a personal relationship with the 
representatives of the conflict parties (Martin 2006: 85).
As a first step, HDC aimed at reaching a ceasefire, decreasing the violence in Aceh and 
thus preparing common ground for the political solution of the conflict based on trust-
building measures. This approach, however, led way to the exclusion of fundamental political 
disagreements from the early stages of the mediation process, left only to be addressed at a 
later occasion. This further caused the two conflict parties to interpret a possible final outcome 
of the ongoing mediation process according to their own aspirations. While the Indonesian 
government saw the mediation process as a confirmation of its view of Aceh remaining an 
integral part of Indonesia, GAM regarded it as a track in the direction of independence (Djalal 
& Djalal 2006: 70-74). Additionally, it seems that HDC’s open, long-term approach, aimed at 
building trust between the conflict parties, had indeed the opposite effect, providing space 
for spoilers to act, in particular for groups from both TNI and GAM that benefited from an 
ongoing conflict. As Mortif points out, the ongoing negotiations from 2000 to 2003 rather 
“created a legacy of suspicion more than a foundation for enduring peace” (2007: 115). 
Besides HDC’s humanitarian approach, Griffiths pursued a strategy of empowerment. This 
strategy, which aims at strengthening the weaker conflict party, is common yet likewise 
controversial among mediators (Ropers 1995: 20). HDC for instance supported GAM in 
transferring itself into a political party, and organised meetings for GAM members with 
politicians abroad (Kay 2003). By doing so HDC was clearly not acting neutral and became 
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vulnerable to criticism from the Indonesian side. Thus in the long run HDC lost its very 
legitimacy as a neutral mediator. On the other hand, Ahtisaari and CMI’s approach differed 
significantly from HDC’s. Ahtisaari’s personal mediation approach was very much characterised 
by his own professional background, which primarily lies in the Finnish Foreign Service, in 
the United Nations and in his former capacity as President of Finland. Ahtisaari met the 
negotiators during talks often with brusque directness, but showed clear preferences for 
state actors as it became obvious at the start of the negotiations. Also regarding mediation 
strategy Ahtisaari’s approach differed. Instead of preparing the ground for a comprehensive 
final agreement by first reaching agreements on ceasefire and on cessation of hostilities, 
Ahtisaari made it clear from the first round of the Helsinki talks that CMI’s direction was 
going the opposite direction. This very approach was marked by Ahtisaari’s phrase “nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed” (Kingsbury 2006: 26). The negotiations mediated by CMI 
were not about reducing violence in Aceh alone but were headed toward a complete and final 
political agreement. Additionally they took place in a rapid fashion and were concluded after 
only six months. Although the Tsunami of December 2004 had altered the situation in Aceh 
and made a resolution of the conflict even more urgent – thus putting pressure on both parties 
– it seems that TNI operations against GAM continued until the Helsinki MoU was signed by both 
the Indonesian government and GAM in August 2005.7
At the beginning of the negotiations it was Ahtisaari asserting pressure on GAM to give up 
its claim for independence (Kingsbury 2006: 23-27). By doing so, Ahtisaari as a mediator left 
the sphere of neutrality in the course of his engagement, like Griffiths before. Yet he did not 
pursue a strategy of empowerment of the weaker party but instead supported Indonesia in its 
insistence on Aceh remaining an integral part of the country. In a way he exploited the grown 
asymmetry to keep negotiations on track. At this point the negotiations nearly collapsed. 
However Ahtisaari did not solely put pressure on GAM to give up its claim for independence 
but chose flexibility in terms of agenda setting. This allowed GAM to bring forward the concept 
of “self-government” (Kingsbury 2006: 79-80). By discussing self-government as a political 
solution for Aceh, the negotiators were able to steer the way between “special autonomy”, as 
initially insisted upon as a precondition by the Indonesian government, as well as GAM’s well-
known demand for complete independence. In fact, the concept of self-government was to 
serve as an empty cartridge in which to fill with content only in the course of the negotiations. 
This allowed GAM to develop a type of autonomy that went beyond the highly sensitive term 
“special autonomy” without using the actual term (Kingsbury 2006: 31-45). As a result the 
former win-loose situation, characteristically for secessionist conflicts, was transferred into 
a win-win situation.
7 Confidential Interview, May 2008, Banda Aceh.
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Negotiators frequently pointed out that the formula of nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed developed its very own dynamic during the negotiations. The negotiating teams 
frequently put issues aside where no common ground could be found in order to focus on 
others. Soon the participants realized that on 70 percent of all political issues, compromises 
had been reached easily. This had the effect that, when negotiations nearly collapsed just 
prior to the signing ceremony, GAM members agreed that in the face of how much had been 
achieved in the duration of the talks, it would have been irresponsible to drop the whole 
effort for just one remaining disagreement.8 Moreover, in the case of CMI negotiations, the 
two conflict parties were engaged in direct talks. These circumstances had the effect of 
functioning as highly efficient trust building measures during the negotiations. The mediation 
style of Ahtisaari and CMI differed fundamentally in two further ways from the Griffiths/
HDC approach. Ahtisaari had far more substantial influence on the content-related outcome 
of the negotiations. At many points Ahtisaari refused to discuss issues which were not put 
on the agenda. On the other hand he is responsible for the inclusion of several other issues. 
Furthermore, at various occasions in the course of the talks Ahtisaari threatened to leave the 
negotiations. This was, for instance, the case at the beginning of the negotiations when the 
question of autonomy vs. independence constituted a major obstacle for the continuation of 
the talks (Awaluddin 2008). Therefore it can be said, that Ahtisaari showed a much higher 
degree of coercive potential as well as stake in the outcome as defined by Smith (1994). It 
can further be argued that in comparison to Griffiths and HDC, Ahtisaari applied directive 
strategies, whereas the former were limited to communication and procedural strategies. The 
fact that a private, non-state mediator like Ahtisaari possessed these powers is closely related 
to a higher political leverage that Ahtisaari brought in. 
Implementation of Agreements
It is particularly important to include the stages of reaching an agreement as well as its 
subsequent implementation when analyzing conflict resolution beside the conflict parties’ 
decision to start or participate in negotiations. Thus, as a third step, conflict parties have to 
decide for and perhaps be supported in implementing the signed agreements, for instance 
through security guarantees provided by a third party (Walter 2002). It is the concluding 
phase of conflict resolution where the weakness of the HDC’s and the strengths of the CMI’s 
efforts become especially obvious. When the conflict parties signed the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement in early 2003, HDC transformed itself from a pure mediation organisation into an 
8 Interview with GAM negotiators Bakhtiar Abdullah and Nur Djuli, May 2008, Banda Aceh.
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organisation responsible for implementation and related security issues. Apart from problems 
deriving from human resource difficulties, the institutions that were built up in accordance 
with the implementation plan, in particular the Joint Security Committee (JSC), were lacking 
the enforcing mechanisms to support the implementation of the COHA. Consequently, after 
more than three years of negotiations and the signing of two ceasefire deals, as well as an 
agreement which foresaw the starting of a political dialogue, the HDC mediation effort broke 
down in the end. A structural weakness of the JSC combined with an increasingly powerful 
role of spoilers within the ranks of the conflict parties caused the collapse (Huber 2004: 30-
40). In the case of the Ahtisaari/CMI engagement on the other hand, the mediator was able to 
commit the European Union (EU) to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki MoU. Among 
EU member states the question of an eventual European involvement was controversial due 
to the risky nature of peace processes and because of the minor importance of the Aceh 
conflict for the EU. “But the ‘tsunami effect’, the desire for the EU to play a political role, 
institutional competition and the persuasive power of Ahtisaari translated into new political 
momentum”, says EU policy director Antje Herrberg from CMI (Herrberg 2008). With the quick 
commissioning of the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) a vacuum between the signing of 
the MoU and the implementation of its security-related regulations was avoided. International 
and local observers agree upon regarding AMM as highly successful, especially concerning its 
responsibilities on decommissioning and redeployment of GAM and TNI troops. In comparison 
to the HDC’s implementation structures, AMM also provided far stronger institutions and 
brought in much higher political leverage in this highly sensitive and thus equally important 
concluding phase of conflict resolution. Furthermore AMM together with CMI functioned as 
the supreme authority in a case of dispute, unlike in the case of HDC where a final authority 
was missing. This condition led to the avoidance of deadlocks on disputes between the conflict 
parties in the stage of implementation (Schulze 2007). 
Mediator Involvement as a Process of Track One and a Half Diplomacy
Further distinctions of mediation types focus on the level where mediation takes place, 
whether among official state or private actors. According to McDonald Joseph Montville 
coined the term track two diplomacy in 1982 in order to define the latter form.9 Track two 
diplomacy usually refers to an informal approach which aims at dealing with the underlying 
roots of conflict. Official state diplomacy on the other hand is called track one. Mapendere 
9 See http://imtd.org/cgi-bin/imtd.cgi?page=msg (retrieved on 08.06.2008).
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has elaborated on the concept of track one and a half diplomacy10, which was originally 
brought forward by Susan A. Naan, describing a mode in between track one, comprised of 
official actors, and track two diplomacy. He defines track 1.5 diplomacy as “peacemaking 
activities undertaken by non-political third parties between high political representatives of 
warring groups, or governments” (Mapendre 2000: 66). Track 1.5 diplomacy is supposed to 
combine the positive aspects which both track one and track two diplomacy have to offer. In 
general it is applied by private, unofficial, third party actors who provide connections to the 
track one level and use these connections in the course of their engagement. According to 
Mapendre advantages of track 1.5 diplomacy are to be able to “fill the gap between the two 
tracks” providing “diplomatic agility” and facilitating communication where no communication 
links exist. Last but not least track 1.5 diplomacy can give leaders an “honourable way out 
of their problems” since a mediator operating in a track 1.5 sphere brings in prominence and 
trustworthiness while lacking real political power (Mapendre 2000: 72-73). As an example for an 
actor, Mapendre mentions the Carter Center, which describes itself as an organisation working 
in the sphere of track 1.5 diplomacy. However, beside Mapendre’s definition, others see track 
1.5 diplomacy as a process that distinguishes itself from track one diplomacy merely by its 
informal character, not by the type of mediator (see Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 
2007). In the course of this analysis, nonetheless, we shall draw on Mapendre’s definition.
The two mediation efforts in Aceh both fit under the label of track 1.5 diplomacy. Both 
were conducted by a private third actor and both initiatives utilised connections to track one 
actors during the mediation process. Apart from this common ground, the two efforts differed 
decisively concerning their usage of track one contacts for the sake of the peace process. HDC 
certainly had backing from the International Community. Apart from financial support, this 
became especially obvious through the engagement of prominent outside experts in 2001, 
the so-called three wise men. The main purpose of their involvement was to give political 
leverage to HDC, which, as it was becoming more and more obvious, the young organisation 
was lacking. As Griffiths however admits it was not the organisation itself suggesting the 
involvement of the three wise men, but the US State Department (Martin 2006: 85-86). Despite 
the fact that HDC received support by the international community and by the US, this very 
example shows that it was not HDC making usage of their contacts to the track one level, but 
the organisation being driven by the interests of a state actor.
Ahtisaari and CMI by contrast were able to use their contacts to official actors actively 
and at the right moment in time. CMI stayed in close contact with EU representatives from 
an early stage of the negotiations on. The EU further began to fund the negotiations itself. 
By bringing in the EU to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki MoU, Ahtisaari secured 
10 Due to practical reasons the notation “track 1.5” will be used in this paper.
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an efficient way of providing security guarantees for the conflict parties. By agreeing on an 
EU led monitoring mission as early as halfway during the talks, the leverage of the mediator 
himself was strengthened in the process of negotiations. Thus, besides the primary function 
of AMM to monitor the implementation of the agreement, the prospect of an EU led mission 
also supported the mediator in the course of the negotiations.
In the case of HDC, a relatively small and inexperienced NGO was responsible for the 
whole process of conflict resolution: from starting the negotiations to reaching agreements 
to finally implementing them. In the case of CMI a different kind of (and as it seems the right 
kind of) actor was in charge at all three stages. During the prelude to negotiations one willing 
conflict party, the Indonesian government with the support of private citizens was the driving 
force. The fact that one of the conflict parties initiated the peace talks can be interpreted 
as a sign of sincerity of this particular actor. The negotiations then were mediated under 
auspices of an experienced, influential and aspiring private mediator, Ahtisaari and CMI. In 
light of the dramatic occurrence of the Tsunami, talks mediated by a private and prominent 
mediator like Ahtisaari presented the perfect opportunity for both conflict parties to solve 
the conflict without losing face. Besides only an informal actor would have been able provide 
the discrete environment for talks necessary at this stage of conflict resolution. Finally, 
implementation of the outcome of the negotiations was monitored by an external regional 
body, the European Union, being a track one actor and therefore providing capacity, essential 
political leverage and necessary security guarantees. As the previous attempts by HDC have 
shown, the involvement of a track one actor at the final period of conflict resolution seems to 
be a highly precious and most necessary condition for succeeding in implementing a reached 
peace agreement.
Conclusions
Contextual factors were crucial in preparing the ground for a possible mediation initiative 
in 2004. On the one hand the conflict showed internal ripeness already prior to the Tsunami, 
such as governmental change on the Indonesian side. Alongside a grown power asymmetry 
between the conflict parties that proved favourable for mediation, despite the common 
assumption that an asymmetry has the opposite effect. On the other hand, by shifting 
attention of the international community to the conflict after the occurrence of the Tsunami, 
the conflict showed international ripeness as well. Beside these significant contextual factors 
however, procedural factors played a major role in successfully reaching an agreement and in 
implementing it. These procedural factors are comprised of Ahtisaari‘s successful mediation 
183
style, consisting of the nothing is agreed until everything is agreed formula as well as of 
applying directive strategies in the course of the negotiation, by asserting pressure on the 
conflict parties, in particular the weaker one. They are further comprised of Ahtisaari’s 
access to influential track one actors, which were ready to guard the implementation of the 
agreement reached under CMI mediated negotiations. 
Others have already elaborated on implications of the successful resolution of the Aceh 
conflict. The former AMM head of mission Pieter Feith has pointed to the EU’s positive role 
opening a new dimension of effective European Common Foreign and Security Policy (Feith 
2007). Mortif (2007) on the other side has highlighted the implications of the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict for the process of democratisation in Indonesia. Yet the author believes that 
the success in Aceh should cause further incitement concerning the role of mediators. Due 
to its successful outcome, Ahtisaari and CMI’s involvement in Aceh, in partnership with other 
involved third party actors, in particular the European Union, can be regarded as an interesting 
example of a Track One and a Half Mediation and Implementation Process. Both track one 
and informal tools have been applied at the right stage of the peace process and thus full 
use was made of all the advantages which formal and informal diplomacy have to offer. One 
should elaborate further on the question of whether the partnership concept as conducted 
successfully in Aceh, between a private organisation like CMI and an official actor like the 
EU, sharing responsibility in the course of conflict resolution, can be adapted and applied on 
similar conflicts.
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